FINAL SCRIPT

Series Title: SECRETS OF WAR

Episode Number 2: THE ULTRA ENIGMA

Contact Name: Chip Proser

TEASE 01:00:00

ANNOUNCER

Next on Secrets of War, throughout the 20^th century great nations and ideologies have battled in every corner of the globe in a secret war in the minds of men. In World War Two one of Germany’s best kept secrets was an Enigma. But this covert weapon would also become one of the greatest tools the Allies used against the Third Reich. The story of the “ultra enigma” is next on Secrets of War.

MAIN TITLE SEQUENCE

Chyron: THE ULTRA ENIGMA

Chyron: NARRATED BY CHARLTON HESTON

ACT ONE

NARRATOR - CHARLTON HESTON

After the First World War…Germany was a nation surrounded former enemies. The Versailles Treaty limited the Germans to a standing army of only 100,000 men, no tanks, and no combat aircraft. Germany had to come up with a way to mobilize so that fewer men could do the job of a much larger army.

The German leadership was forced to rely on things that could not be limited by treaty; engineering, design, automation, and the internal combustion engine. Coupled with a strategic system of railways and roads, the motor vehicle was the means to move forces from one side of the country to the other.

An obscure German officer, Heinz Guderian, studied British and French theories of armored warfare.

While most generals believed that tanks should be dispersed along the front and used only in infantry support, Guderian devised a new doctrine…the Panzer Corps. A radical new idea to employ high speed tanks and mechanized infantry, combined with mobile artillery and close air support. And all the units would have the same speed in the field as the tank.

Guderian became known as a tank commander, but he was first a signals officer. To coordinate his revolutionary doctrine of rapid tactical maneuver, every tank was outfitted with radio.

“the dive bombers will form a flying artillery, directed to work in harmony with ground forces through good radio communications. The real secret is speed---speed of attack through a speed of communications.” General Gerhard Milch, Secretary of State for Air

At sea radio was even more indispensable…

CHYRON: DAVID KAHN, AUTHOR, “BREAKING ENIGMA”

TC: 01:03:50;13

THE GERMAN NAVY REALIZED THAT IT WOULDN’T WIN ANY FUTURE WAR AGAINST GREAT BRITAIN BY BEATING THEM AT SEA WITH BATTLESHIPS. IT HAD TO STRANGLE GREAT BRITAIN, AND IT CAN ONLY DO THIS WITH SUBMARINES.

A young admiral, Karl Doenitz, took over command of the U-boats

DAVID KAHN

DOENITZ REALIZED THAT THE ONLY WAY IN WHICH THE U-BOATS COULD WORK EFFECTIVELY AGAINST THE CONVOY WAS IN CONCERTED ACTION.

U-boats would transmit reports, Doenitz would coordinate the campaign from land, using radio.

With all units under radio control, commanders could exploit the changing battlefield. The secret weapon of the blitzkrieg, the lightning war, would be radio. ...it was also the secret weakness… the enemy would be listening… and the Germans had paid dearly for cryptologic failure in World War One.

DAVID KAHN

EARLY IN WORLD WAR I THE GERMAN LIGHT CRUISER, THE MAGDEBURG, RAN AGROUND IN THE BALTIC SEA. THE RUSSIANS, NEAR WHOSE TERRITORY THIS WAS, CAPTURED THIS SHIP AND FOUND IN IT THE GERMAN NAVY’S SECRET CODE BOOK.

A Russian destroyer was dispatched to bring the book to London...to the first sea lord... …Winston Churchill

DAVID KAHN

THE BRITISH USED IT TO DE-CODE GERMAN NAVAL MESSAGES THROUGHOUT THE WAR AND BOTTLE UP THE GERMAN FLEET...

In the battles of Dogger Bank and Jutland the British exploited their secret knowledge.

“The unexpected presence of the English leads to the conclusion that the encounter was not a matter of chance, but that our plan in some way or other had got to the knowledge of the English.” Admiral Scheer, Commander-in-Chief of the German High Seas Fleet.

In 1925 Churchill published his history of World War One and made a blunder he would later regret. He gave away the secret of the codes.

CHYRON: NORMAN POLMAR, CO-AUTHOR, “SPY BOOK”

TC: 01:06:06;22

THE GERMANS UPON READING THIS REALIZED THAT CODE BOOKS WERE TOO VULNERABLE TO USE IN MODERN WARFARE.

To command the Wehrmacht, the war machine at machine speed they needed a code machine, a truth-protecting machine. A machine to obscure. A machine to puzzle…

And in Berlin, a German engineer, Arthur Scherbius demonstrated an encoding machine available on the commercial market. He named it after a haunting composition by the British composer, Sir Edward Elgar, the Enigma Variations.

DAVID KAHN

THE ENIGMA CYPHER MACHINE HAD A ROW OF TYPEWRITER KEYS WHICH YOU PRESSED TO PUT THE MESSAGE INTO CODE. IT RAN THROUGH A CURRENTAND EMERGED AS LIT UP LETTERS ON A SCREEN. SO YOU PRESSED AN “A” OUT WOULD COME “Q”. YOU PRESSED AN “A” AGAIN OUT WOULD COME AN “X” AND SO FORTH. THE HEART OF THE MACHINE WAS A WIRED CODE WHEEL.

IT CONTINUES TURNING TWENTY SIX TIMES, EACH TIME YOUR PRESSING “A” A DIFFERENT LETTER WILL COME OUT. NEXT TO THIS WIRED CODE WHEEL YOU HAVE ANOTHER ONE, SO THAT LIKE THE ODOMETER ON YOUR CAR TURNS OVER ONE TURN FOR ONE REVOLUTION, THEN THE NEXT ONE TURNS OVER ONE SPACE, YOU CAN THEN HAVE TWENTY SIX, TIMES TWENTY SIX, TIMES TWENTY SIX, OR SEVENTY THOUSAND IN CHANGE, NUMBER OF COMBINATIONS BEFORE THOSE SEQUENCE OF LETTERS REPEATS.

THE PROBLEM FOR THE DECODER IS NOT JUST FINDING THE ORIGINAL WIRING HERE, BUT DETERMINING WHICH ROTORS ARE IN WHICH POSITION AND WHAT STARTING POSITION, AND THERE ARE A NUMBER OF OTJER COMBINATIONS SO THIS IS AN ENORMOUSLY COMPLICATED AND VERY WIDE-RANGING PROBLEM

CHYRON: TOM ALLEN, CO-AUTHOR “SPY BOOK”

TC:01:07:59;09

YOU CAN KEEP CHANGING THESE CYLINDERS, AND KEEP CHANGING THE CODES CONSTANTLY SO THAT EVEN IF THE ENEMY MANAGED TO START TO CRACK A MESSAGE, BY THE TIME THE ENEMY HAS CRACKED THE MESSAGE, THE PURPOSE OF THE MESSAGE IS ALL GONE.

The power of the Enigma was in the vast number of crypto-variables or different combinations of encoding possibilities that it could generate with only five variable components. A plugboard, three ordered rotors each with twenty-six starting positions, a moveable ring on each rotor, and a reflector half rotor.

The number of these possible configurations was a figure so large that it has no name except three times ten to the one hundred and fourteenth power. By comparison it is estimated there are only ten to the seventy nine numbers of atoms in the entire observable universe. This gave the Germans confidence in their machine.

As the Nazis gained power, this common enemy drew British and French intelligence together. But the

Poles, surrounded and outnumbered, had a special need to know German intentions. Polish intelligence

went on high alert. It monitored all forms of German communication, including the mails.

CHYRON: JOSEF GARLINSKI, AUTHOR “INTERCEPT”

TC: 01:09:28;29

ABOUT 1930 THERE WAS A PARCEL SENT FROM GERMANY TO WARSAW TO THE GERMAN CONSUL THERE. THAT WAS SATURDAY. PARCELS ARE NOT DELIVERED. SO THE POLISH INTELLIGENCE WAS INFORMED ABOUT THIS.

It was a code machine, an Enigma and they only had it for forty-eight hours.

JOSEF GARLINSKI

THEY MAKE ALL POSSIBLE COPIES, PHOTOGRAPH ETC., PACK THIS SO THE GERMANS WILL NOT KNOW THAT THE PACKAGE WAS OPENED, AND IT WAS DELIVERED TO GERMAN CONSUL ON MONDAY MORNING.

The Poles had the insight that machine codes could be broken by mathematicians. They asked a promising young student, Marion Rejewski, to look into the Enigma.

DAVID KAHN

A DECODING JOB SEEMS TO ME ONE OF THE MOST DIFFICULT, LABORIOUS, AND BOTH BORING AND THRILLING THINGS THAT YOU CAN DO. YOU’RE LOOKING AT A SEA OF NUMBERS OR LETTERS, THEY MAKE ABSOLUTELY NO SENSE. WHAT YOU’RE TRYING TO DO IS FIND LITTLE PATTERNS THERE, REPETITIONS.

German messages were often transmitted on the same net. Each command had different keys. Before encoding, the sender set his three rotors to a setting from the key list, chose a wheel setting at random, and encrypted the key. He then sent the three letters. To avoid confusion, he sent these key letters twice. Rejewski saw quickly that they were the key. This knowledge set up harmonics, mathematical relationships he could exploit. The first potential break into Enigma.

JOSEF GARLINSKI

THREE POLES, CRYPTANALYSTS, REJEWSKI, ROZYNSKI, ZYGALSKI. THEY WERE YOUNG, FULL OF, OF IDEAS BECAUSE TO BREAK SOMETHING LIKE ENIGMA YOU HAVE ALSO A VISION, YOU HAVE TO HAVE IMAGINATION.

CHYRON: TONY SALES, BLETCHLEY PARK

TC: 01:11:37;29

THE GREATEST WAS MARION REJEWSKI, AND HE PRODUCED SOME VERY ELEGANT MATHEMATICAL THEORIES WHICH ENABLED HIM TO WORK OUT WHICH ROTORS WERE ACTUALLY IN THE MACHINE FOR A PARTICULAR TRANSMISSION. BUT THEY COULDN’T DECIPHER THE MESSAGES BECAUSE THE GERMANS, NOT BEING STUPID, HAD USED DIFFERENT WIRINGS INSIDE THE ROTORS TO WHAT THOSE AVAILABLE ON THE COMMERCIAL ENIGMA.

It looked hopeless. Despite their best efforts the Poles couldn’t crack the code. Then, the Polish codebreakers got a break from an unlikely source in the very shadow of the Brandenberg Gate in Berlin.

ACT TWO

In 1931 a man walked into the French embassy in Berlin. He claimed to be an officer in the Chiffrierstelle, the German coding office. He offered to sell secrets. The French were suspicious, but the man claimed to have documents relating to the Enigma machine. The bait was vital. Enigma could give them a window into the innermost secrets of the German command.

The German officer was Hans Thilo Schmidt but what were his motives? It could be a provocation, a trick. He might be there to mislead them, or deceive them or to entrap them. Why would a German officer betray the most closely held secrets of his nation?

The answer was basic. The motive was money. The French assigned an agent, Col. Bertrand to look into the man’s background.

They found that Schmidt had an older brother, Rudolph who commanded the code office.

CHYRON: PAUL PAILLOLE, COLONEL (RET.) FRENCH INTELLIGENCE

TC: 01:13:24;08

WORLD WAR ONE HAD A LITTLE BIT CORRUPTED THE YOUNG SCHMIDT. HE WAS IN LAZY. HE WAS NOT INERESTED IN MAKING AN HONEST LIVING. HE PREFERRED CHASING GIRLS TO ANYTHING ELSE.

His brother, Rudolph, found a job for him in the cipher center.

PAUL PAILLOLE

HANS THILO SCHMIDT WAS A SORDID GUY WHO REALIZED THAT HE HAD ACCESS TO THE MOST SECRET SECRET, HE RECEIVED ABOUT TEN MILLION IN TODAY'S FRANCS. AN ENORMOUS AMOUNT.

IT IS CERTAIN WE WERE DEALING WITH A TOUGH AND INTELLIGENT MAN, AND ONCE HE GOT THE MONEY, HE WANTED TO QUIT. WE HAD TO MAKE HIM UNDERSTAND THAT// HE HAD ENTERED A WORLD FROM WHICH THERE WAS NO ESCAPE.

Bertrand quickly photographed the documents. When he returned to Paris with the negatives, he realized what he had. He had the key to Enigma.

CHYRON: RUSSEL B. HOLMES, AUTHOR “A TRANSLATOR’S GUIDE TO THE SECRET

WAR”

TC: 01:14:38;26

BERTRAND WENT TO HIS OWN PEOPLE IN THE CIPHER OFFICE TO STUDY THE DOCUMENTS AND SAID, “WELL IT’S A MACHINE, IT’S IMPOSSIBLE TO DO ANYTHING”

Bertrand offered the secrets to the British but had no more success.

TONY SALE

AND THE FRENCH THAT TIME, AS THE BRITISH HAVE GOTTEN NOWHERE WITH BREAKING ENIGMA, THEY WERE TRYING LINGUISTIC ATTACKS WHICH WERE BOUND TO FAIL. AND SO THE FRENCH, AS A GESTURE OF GOOD WILL, GAVE THIS INFORMATION TO THE POLES NOT KNOWING WHAT THE POLES HAD BEEN UP TO.

Schmidt handed over two sets of keys for two different quarters. The last month of the third quarter and first month of the fourth.

This gave Rejewski what he needed. He compared settings in two quarters and found there were three rotors set in different order each quarter. With this information for the first time Enigma could be broken.

RUSSEL HOLMES

BUT THEN OF COURSE THE PROBLEM WAS THEY HAD TO HAVE THE KEYS IN ORDER TO PUT THE, SET UP THE MACHINE TO BREAK THE MESSAGES THAT THEY WOULD RECEIVE.

In the next years Schmidt met thirty-four times with the French. He handed over twenty five keys. His handler’s suspected his motives were changing. He had studied the Nazis and had now joined the Nazi party… to work against it.

The originals went back into the Chifferstelle safe. The monthly keys found their way to Poland. Now Rejewski could work out the wiring.

TONY SALE

ONE OF THE GREATEST FEATS OF CRYPTOGRAPHY, AND IT RAISES REJEWSKI, TO THE TOP OF THE PANTHEON OF CODE BREAKERS. SO BY THE BEGINNING OF 1932 THE POLES HAD ACTUALLY GOTTEN THE WIRING OF ENIGMA ROTORS. THEY THEN MANUFACTURED COPIES OF THE ENIGMA MACHINE,

Rejewski then designed a machine he called “the Bomba” which used eighteen rotors to test the variations.

TONY SALE

THE POLES HAVE GOTTEN SO GOOD AT ALL OF THIS THAT THEY WERE ACTUALLY BREAKING SEVENTY FIVE PERCENT OF THE MESSAGES THEY WERE INTERCEPTING, AND THEY KEPT VERY, VERY QUIET ABOUT IT.

What the Poles decrypted was terrifying.

PAUL PAILLOLE

IN NOVEMBER 1937, SCHMIDT INFORMS US THAT A SECRET MEETING, HAS JUST TAKEN PLACE AT THE REICH’S CHANCELLERY. AT THIS MEETING, HITLER REVEALED HIS AMBITIONS.

“IN 1938 , I WANT THE ANSCHLUSS. AFTER THE ANSCHLUSS, I WANT CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THEN THE SUDETENLAND. AFTER SUDETENLAND, I WANT POLAND. AFTER POLAND, I WANT TO ELIMINATE THE WESTERN THREAT BY GOING TO BELGIUM AND THE NETHERLANDS AND TO FRANCE” HE’S ALSO DRAWN A MAP THAT SHOWS THE TERRITORY HE WANTS, AND THIS MAP, WE’VE GOT IT, THANKS TO SCHMIDT.

WE KNEW IT IN 1937, WHAT HAVE WE DONE WITH THIS INFORMATION? NOTHING.

The Germans were preparing for war. They turned their attention to the machine...they added new keys to the Enigma…

TONY SALE

AND THEN IN 1938, THE GERMANS CHANGED THE SYSTEM WHICH STOPPED MARION REJEWSKI’S ORIGINAL MATHEMATICAL CALCULATIONS WORKING. BUT THEN ZYGALSKY PRODUCED SOME THINGS CALLED ZYGALSKY’S SHEETS, AND THESE WERE PERFORATED SHEETS, THE GRILL METHOD.

By passing light through multiple stacked sheets, constants in the code were instantly recognized. But then, the Germans introduced two more rotors. It was too much for the Poles. Suddenly they realized they needed help.

JOSEF GARLINSKI

DELEGATION FROM FRANCE, AND DELEGATION FROM GREAT BRITAIN WAS INVITED, TO THE SMALL VILLAGE, PYRY NOT FAR FROM WARSAW, AND THERE POLISH CRYPT ANALYSTS PRESENTED EACH DELEGATION WITH ONE ENIGMA BUILT IN POLAND,

As the British and French spirited the Enigmas out of Poland, Hans-Thilo Schmidt issued a final warning.

PAUL PAILLOLE

ONE OF THE LAST MESSAGES HE SENT WAS IN FORM OF A MAP WITH INVISIBLE INK. IN JUNE OF 1939, HE WROTE, "WATCH OUT AT THE END OF AUGUST.”

At daybreak on September 1, 1939, blitzkrieg was no longer just a theory. Tank divisions exploded into Poland. The Luftwaffe pounded airfields and supply lines. Britain and France declared war on Germany. Polish cavalry attacked German tanks. Warsaw fell

ACT THREE

Spring 1940…as blitzkrieg threatened Europe the Enigmatic battle was joined in England in a small railway junction town midway between Oxford and Cambridge. Bletchley Park, known as Station X was secret headquarters for The Government Code and Cipher School. The members of GC & CS also called themselves The Golf Club and Chess Society.

TOM ALLEN

THE BRITISH APPROACH IS TO GATHER TOGETHER IN BLETCHLEY PARK, OUTSIDE OF LONDON, EVERYBODY THEY CAN THINK OF WHO MIGHT BE ABLE TO CONTRIBUTE TO CODEBREAKING. THEY ARE GOING TO GET MATHEMATICIANS, PEOPLE WHO KNOW HOW TO BREAK THE CROSSWORD PUZZLE IN THE TIMES, THEY ARE GOING TO GET DAFFY KIND OF PEOPLE WHO ARE ECCENTRIC AND WANDER AROUND, BUT THEY’VE GOT GOOD BRAINS// SO IN A SENSE, YOU’VE GOT TWO CULTURES, ONE IN THE MACHINE THAT’S DISTRUSTFUL OF HUMAN BEINGS, AND YOU’VE GOT THE BRITISH SOCIETY SAYING. HMM, WE’LL GET THESE FUNNY GUYS FROM OXFORD TOGETHER, AND THEY’LL COME UP WITH SOMETHING.

TONY SALE

THEY PUT AERIALS ALL AROUND AND STARTED LISTENING TO GERMAN RADIO TRANSMISSIONS. BUT THEY SOON REALIZED IT WASN’T A PRETTY BRIGHT IDEA TO HAVE AERIALS ALL OVER A SITE YOU WANTED TO KEEP SECRET, SO THEY MOVED THE LISTENING OUT TO THE SO-CALLED “Y” STATIONS, THE INTERCEPT STATIONS ALL OVER THE COUNTRY,

The young mathematician, Gordon Welchman studied the intercepts. Different keys suggested different radio webs, different command structures. He charted the intercepts, started to find context, to build a picture of the nets and keys. Meanwhile Harry Hinsley, a young Cambridge student, analyzed the traffic.

CHYRON: SIR HARRY HINSLEY, CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY

TC: 01:21:24;05

ONCE THE GERMAN RADIO NETWORK HAD HAD TO EXTEND ITSELF ALONG THE NORWEGIAN COAST, YOU SEE AFTER THE OCCUPATION OF NORWAY, IT BECAME MUCH MORE VOLATILE, YOU KNOW IT’S BEHAVIOR BEGAN TO, VARY MUCH MORE THAN PREVIOUSLY. I BEGAN TO BE ABLE TO FORECAST NAVAL BECAUSE BEHAVIOR OF THIS GREAT SIGNALS IS SO STRANGE THAT I HAD NO DOUBT THAT IT MEANT THE MOVEMENT OF BIG SHIPS OUT OF THE BALTIC AND NOTHING SO STARTLING HAD HAPPENED BEFORE.

I SPOKE TO A MAN AT THE OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE CENTER AND SAID, “DO SOMETHING. THERE IS SOMETHING GOING TO MOVE OUT OF THE BALTIC, BIG STUFF.”

Hinsley was a twenty one year old undergraduate, Bletchley wasn’t supposed to do intelligence work, only cryptanalysis

HARRY HINSLEY

AND HE LISTENED VERY PATIENTLY. WROTE MY COMMENTS IN THEIR WAR DIARY, BUT HE WOULDN”T TAKE IT FURTHER. ANYWAY THEY TOOK NO ACTION. TWO BATTLE CRUISERS, SCHARNHORST AND GNEISENAU WENT UP THE COAST, SANK THE GLORIOUS WITHOUT ANY WARNING, SHE DIDN’T HAVE TIME TO MAKE A SIGNAL, AND THE FIRST WE HEARD ABOUT IT WAS FROM A GERMAN RADIO BROADCAST. WELL YOU CAN IMAGINE THE RESULTS OF THAT ON THE RELATIONS BETWEEN US AND THE ADMIRALTY.

Bletchley was learning to combine signals intelligence with traffic analysis and with what they called cribs.

TONY SALE

IT’S NOT THE CIPHER SYSTEM, IT’S THE HUMANS AROUND THE OUTSIDE THAT CAUSE THE PROBLEM. AND THIS WAS VERY MUCH THE CASE WITH THE GERMANS. THEY WERE VERY SLIP SHOD AND THEY USED, VERY SLAP HAPPY WAYS OF SENDING MESSAGES, IN PARTICULAR OF SELECTING MESSAGE KEYS,

ONE OF THE FAVORITE PEOPLE OF BLETCHLEY PARK HERE WAS SOME POOR GERMAN, EVERY WEEK HE SET HIS ENIGMA TO THE LETTER START POSITION W-A-L, AND THEN TURNED THEM TO THE MESSAGE K-L-A. AND AFTER A WHILE THEY WORKED OUT, THIS WAS WALTER, AND HIS GIRLFRIEND’S NAME WAS KLARA, THAT’S HOW HE REMEMBERED IT.

NORMAN POLMAR

EVERY MAJOR COMMAND WOULD SEND A BIRTHDAY GREETING TO HITLER, SUDDENLY SEVERAL HUNDRED AIR, GROUND, AND NAVAL COMMANDS WOULD BE SENDING ENCRYPTED MESSAGES TO BERLIN CONGRATULATING HITLER ON HIS BIRTHDAY. THIS GAVE THEM FANTASTIC NUMBERS OF CRIBS.

TONY SALE

NOW A CRIB IS KNOWN PLAIN TEXT IN MODERN TERMS WHERE FROM OTHER INFERENCES YOU CAN GUESS PRETTY WELL WHAT THE TEXT WAS WHICH WAS USED TO ENCIPHER THIS PARTICULAR MESSAGE.

CRIB HUNTING WAS A MAJOR EXERCISE HERE AND IT STARTED AS SOON AS YOU BEGAN TO GET TRAFFIC IN. IT WAS A CONTINUOUS RACE AGAINST TIME, EVERY SECOND COUNTED, A HUNDRED PERCENT ACCURACY, COULDN’T MAKE ANY MISTAKES,

PETER HILTON

I REMEMBER FOR EXAMPLE WORKING FOR THIRTY SIX HOURS AT A STRETCH ON ONE OR TWO OCCASIONS, // AND BEING UNAWARE OF ANY FATIGUE. I FOUND IT ENORMOUS FUN.

TONY SALE

THE GERMANS CHANGED THE KEY EVERY NIGHT AT MIDNIGHT, AND IF YOU COULD BREAK ONE OR TWO MESSAGES ON THAT KEY, THEN YOU WERE INTO THE WHOLE OF THE TRANSMISSIONS FOR THE REST OF THOSE TWENTY FOUR HOURS.

A crib was a glimpse into the Enigma, a crack in the armor. Now they must throw all their forces into the breach.

TOM ALLEN

AND WHAT THEY COME UP WITH IS, WE’VE GOT TO GET A MACHINE THAT WILL CRACK MACHINE,..

The machine the British set out to build was first imagined by an eccentric mathematical genius. In 1936 Alan Turing wrote a paper “on the computability of numbers”, and created something new.

CHYRON: ANDREW HODGES, AUTHOR “ALAN TURING, THE ENIGMA”

TC: 01:25:22;07

TURING WAS THE FIRST TO BRING SCIENTIFIC METHOD INTO IT AT ALL, AND THAT HE FOLLOWED THROUGH WITH THE WHOLE THEORY OF PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS WHICH WAS APPLIED TO ALL THE ASPECTS TO THE HIGH LEVEL WORK.

TONY SALE

HE WAS BRILLIANT, THERE’S NO QUESTION ABOUT THAT, AND OF COURSE HE HAD THESE ECCENTRIC BEHAVIOR LIKE A LOT OF PEOPLE, BUT IT WAS A BIT EXTREME IN HIM.

ANDREW HODGES

THERE ARE CERTAIN THINGS THAT TURING DID WHICH ANNOYED PEOPLE, LIKE HE DIDN’T, SAY HELLO TO PEOPLE WHEN HE SAW THEM FIRST THING IN THE MORNING ON THE BASIS THAT HE’D ACTUALLY SAID HELLO TO THEM THE DAY BEFORE. HE DIDN’T THINK IT MIGHT MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE ‘CAUSE THE SUN HAD BROKEN AGAIN.

Turing wandered around Bletchley wearing his gas mask. It aided his hay fever but added to his eccentric legend...

CHYRON: I.J. GOOD, PROFESSOR EMERITUS, VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE

TC: 01:26:01;14

HE WOULD SEE TO THE HEART OF A PROBLEM. THAT’S A GREAT GIFT TO BE ABLE TO GET RIGHT TO THE HEART OF A PROBLEM.

It was the entsheidungsproblem, the question of whether there is some mathematical method to learn the truth. To break a code. Cribs and breaks had reduced the possibilities generated by Enigma to 1023 only one hundred thousand billion billion …

TONY SALE

THE PROBLEM IS IN THIS ENORMOUS RANGE OF TEN TO THE TWENTIETH POSSIBILITIES TO FIND THE ONE WHICH GIVES YOU THE SOLUTION, AND YOU’VE GOT TO FIND THAT QUICKLY.

ANDREW HODGES

YOU NEED SOME VERY CLEVER LOGICAL IDEAS TO ELIMINATE HUGE NUMBERS OF THOSE POSSIBILITIES.

I.J. GOOD

HE CAME UP WITH A VERY, I THINK VERY BRILLIANT IDEA, AND THAT WAS THAT FROM A CONTRADICTION YOU CAN DEDUCE EVERYTHING.

Turing’s idea is not to find the right answer, but the wrong ones. A wrong answer would give an infinite number of solutions. If you get infinite solutions they must be wrong. One could identify these and eliminate them.

TONY SALE

IF YOU IMAGINE THIS AS BEING A SEARCH TREE WHERE YOU HAVE A PEAK AND YOU GO DOWN TO, TEN TO TWENTY LEAVES AT THE BOTTOM OF THIS, THE PRIOR BEST KNOWLEDGE WAS TO, TO WORK YOUR WAY DOWN THIS TREE LOOKING FOR THE ONE SOLUTION WHICH GAVE THE ANSWER. TURING SAID, “NO, THAT ISN’T THE WAY TO DO IT.” WHAT YOU DO IS YOU PRUNE OFF ALL THE BRANCHES THAT IT CAN’T POSSIBLY BE, ALRIGHT? AND THEN YOU’RE LEFT WITH A POSSIBLE NUMBER OF SOLUTIONS WHICH YOU THEN HAVE GOT TO INVESTIGATE...

With human brainpower the idea of first eliminating wrong answers is useless, it would take years, but Turing attempted to model the mind as machine, in which thought could be broken down into small tasks and attacked step by step in machine logic. This obscure revolutionary thought would not only have the greatest effect on the war but in ways not yet imagined on future civilization..

Turing then took the idea of the Polish Bomba and developed it into the Turing Bombe with dozens of rotors. This machine rapidly churned through all key possibilities. Wrong ones would churn on and on. Possible keys that couldn’t be proven wrong, the Bombe would stop.

Cryptoanalysts set this potential key into an Enigma and typed in the intercepted code. If plain text decrypt came out, they had broken the key. They were in…

TONY SALE

AND THEY RECKONED IN HUT SIX, AND HUT EIGHT. IF THEY HADN’T DONE VERY WELL, IF THEY HADN’T BROKEN IT BY THREE O’CLOCK IN THE MORNING. AND THE BOGIE TIME FOR BREAKING AN ENIGMA KEY WAS FOURTEEN MINUTES...

PETER HILTON

WHEN YOU COMBINE NAZI STUPIDITY WITH THE GERMAN LOVE OF GOOD ORDER, YOU AGAIN GET SOMETHING WHICH IS VERY VULNERABLE BECAUSE IT MEANT NOT ONLY DID THEY SEND OUT THE GREAT STATEMENTS OF THEIR MARVELOUS VICTORIES EACH DAY, BUT THEY’VE SENT THEM OUT AT THE SAME TIME EACH DAY SO WE COULD IDENTIFY. NOT ONLY DID THEY SEND THEM OUT AT THE SAME TIME EACH DAY, BUT THEY SENT THEM OUT ON EVERY CHANNEL. SO IF WE WERE READING ONE CIPHER WE WOULD GET THE CLEAR AND WE WOULD USE THAT CLEAR TO OBTAIN KEY FOR ANOTHER CIPHER.

In the spring of 1940, the Allies were starting to break the codes but without the ability to act on what they learn, there is little they can do. Although they’ve declared it, the British were not prepared for war. On land the blitzkrieg paused. Soldiers settled down to the sitzkrieg, the phony war.” ... At sea the war was not so phony. Death and destruction talked the North Atlantic.

ACT FOUR

In the longest battle of the war, in the Atlantic, Admiral Karl Doenitz’s U-boats threatened the lifeline of the Allies.

CHYRON: I.J. GOOD, PROFESSOR EMERITUS, VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE

TC: 01:30:33;25

CHURCHILL WAS ALWAYS AWARE THAT THIS WAS THE CRITICAL ISSUE. IF BRITAIN HAD LOST THE BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC WE WOULD SIMPLY HAVE HAD TO RESIGN. WE JUST WOULD HAVE TO GIVE UP.

In this critical battle the naval Enigma with a special keying system could not be read…

CHYRON: SIR HARRY HINSLEY, CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY

TC: 01:30:52;27

THE IDEA THAT TURING CONSTANTLY PRESSED ON ME YOU CAN NOT GET INTO THIS NAVAL ENIGMA UNLESS WE CAN GET SOME EXTERNAL MATERIAL. THAT WAS ENOUGH. THAT WAS ENOUGH.

Hinsley himself came up with the answer.

HARRY HINSLEY

THE GERMANS KEPT TWO LITTLE TRAWLERS ON STATION IN THE ARCTIC, ONE OFF GREENLAND, ONE OFF NORTHERN ICELAND FOR WEATHER REPORTING.

I DISCOVERED THEIR PATROL POSITIONS WHICH WERE ALWAYS THE SAME, THAT THEY WERE ON STATION FOR SEVEN, EIGHT WEEKS, AND THAT THEY CARRIED THE ENIGMA,

BELIEVE IT OR NOT, EVEN IN THOSE LITLE TRAWLERS DOING NOTHING BUT REPORTING WEATHER, THEY HAD THE ENIGMA, AND I GUESSED I KNEW THAT IF THEY WERE OUT FOR EIGHT WEEKS, THEY HAD TO HAVE MORE THAN ONE MONTH’S SETTING SHEET. THE CORRECT SETTING SHEET WOULD BE ON THE OPERATOR’S DESK, AND HE HAD A BUCKET OF WATER NEXT TO HIS DESK. IF HE WAS BOARDED HE PUT THE SETTINGS IN THE BUCKET, AND THE INK RAN, BUT THE NEXT MONTH’S WOULD BE IN THE SAFE.

Hinsley called the admiralty. Destroyers steamed out of Scapa Flow.

HARRY HINSLEY

JUST WHEN THE SUN WAS COMING UP. BOARDING PARTY ON BOARD BEFORE THE BOYS ARE AWAKE, OUR MEN DOWN TO THE SIGNALING OFFICE AND THE CAPTAIN’S CABIN. ENGINEER BREAKS THE SAFE, OUT THEY COME, TOW THE TRAWLER BACK TO SCAPA FLOW, THE GERMAN TRAWLER CREW IN CANNERY, VERY SECURE PREMISES WHERE THEY WON’T BE ABLE TO REPORT THAT THEY’VE BEEN BOARDED. BEAUTIFUL JOB, NICE, SWEET OPERATION.

SIR HARRY HINSLEY

EVERY MORNING, EIGHT O’CLOCK IN THE MORNING, REGULAR AS CLOCK WORK, HE WOULD COME, “THIS IS WEATHER STATION BREST REPORTING AN 0800 WELL YOU PUT THAT ON TURING MACHINES AND OUT COMES THE SETTING FOR THE DAY.

They were in to the naval Enigma.

HARRY HINSLEY

USING IT NOW OFF OFFENSIVELY WE SIMPLY HAMMERED THE U-BOATS. THEIR LIFE WAS A MISERY.

CHYRON: PAUL PAILLOLE, COLONEL (RET.) FRENCH INTELLIGENCE

TC: 01:33:15;27

WE WERE INFORMED BY SCHMIDT ABOUT THE GERMAN COMMAND'S INTENTION TO PENETRATE BELGIUM AND , ADVANCE TO FRANCE RIGHT THROUGH THE ARDENNES

French intelligence reported Schmidt’s warning to the high command. The response was disbelief!

PAUL PAILLOLE

THEY SAID, “IT IS NOT POSSIBLE THAT A ARMORED FORCE , THE WEHRMACHT COULD CROSS THE ARDENNES. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE."

But it was. For tanks and mechanized Panzer forces the hills and valleys of the Ardennes presented no barrier. The Nazi blitzkrieg advanced in two pincers into the low countries and France. The British expeditionary force was cut off on the channel coast.

It would take only a few days to destroy the British forces, then Bletchley broke an intercept.

HARRY HINSLEY

WITH OPERATOR MISTAKES IN THE GERMAN AIR FORCE WHICH WERE BADLY TRAINED AS SIGNALERS, WE BROKE THE GERMAN AIR FORCE CIPHER.

On the radio net, an argument raged. Fieldmarshal Hermann Goering boasted his Luftwaffe would destroy the enemy.

Panzer generals pleaded for permission to attack, but hoping for a negotiated peace, Hitler ordered his generals to hold. Through Enigma intercepts, the British knew they had time. Time to mount Operation Dynamo. Time to evacuate… Dunkirk.

Now the Germans were poised for Operation Sealion, the invasion of the British Isles. But first they must gain control of the skies. First they must defeat the Royal Air Force.

With the fall of France, army messages went to more secure ground lines. But Luftwaffe intercepts revealed German thinking. On the channel coast the Germans were lengthening runways for an air assault on Britain.

Churchill spoke to the nation. “never in the course of human endeavor has so much been owed by so many to so few.” Not so few as was thought. The Battle of Britain was the RAF’s finest hour, but Churchill knew but could not disclose…the secret army at Bletchley was growing...nearly ten thousand people were now hard at work breaking Enigma.

In August, Goering’s message to his troops decrypted as “alder tag”…eagle day. Something was up…but what? Then, on August thirteenth, a Luftwaffe bomber stream appeared roaring down the Thames. Eagle day, an all-out assault on London was designed to break the will of the British. RAF fighters swarmed the first wave of bombers then rearmed to meet the second.

The bombers broke off the attack and fled. To the surprised Germans it appeared that the numbers of British fighters was inexhaustible. The Germans lost heart.

In September Enigma broke a momentous message. Hitler had ordered the removal of invasion support craft. Britain had held off the vaunted Luftwaffe.

Enigma intercepts, now code-named Ultra started to play a part in an offensive strategy.

SIR HARRY HINSLEY

WELL AS YOU CAN IMAGINE ULTRA, WHICH WAS THE PRODUCT OF THE ENIGMA, HAD TO BE DISTRIBUTED AND USED WITH IMMENSE CARE.

AT EVERY COMMAND POST THERE WAS A BLETCHLEY TRAINED SIGNALER AND DECIPHERER. THEY DID THE SIGNALING, TOOK THE DECRYPT ACROSS TO THE INTELLIGENCE STAFF, STOOD OVER IT TIL IT WAS FINISHED WITH, COLLECTED IT BACK, BURNED IT. IT WAS THEY THAT DID THE SIGNALLING TOOK THE DECRYPT ACROSS.

TONY SALE

IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT THAT THE FIELD COMMANDERS UNDERSTOOD, AND THEY WERE EXPRESSLY, COMMANDED BY CHURCHILL. THEY WOULD TAKE NO ACTION WHICH COULD GIVE AWAY TO THE AXIS FORCES THAT THE INFORMATION HAD COME FROM ULTRA.

CHYRON: DR. JACK INGRAM, NATIONAL CRYPTOLOGIC MUSEUM

TC: 01:38:08;13

IF YOU KNEW FROM ULTRA, THAT THERE WAS A SHIP IN THERE THAT YOU WANTED TO SINK, YOU WOULD TRY TO HAVE AN AIR PLANE SHOW UP NEAR THAT SHIP THAT THEY WOULD SEE DROP OUT OF THE CLOUDS SO THEY’D LOOK UP AND SAY, “WE’VE BEEN SPOTTED BY AN ALLIED AIR CRAFT.” SO WHEN IT GOT TORPEDOED OR ATTACKED LATER, THEY DIDN’T KNOW IT WAS BECAUSE WE HAD BROKEN ENCRYPTED MESSAGE.

In North Africa signals security was critical. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel was reading a broken American code which revealed British plans. Informed by Ultra and captured documents of the breach the Americans changed their code. Rommel’s legendary intuitive strategy waned.

SIR HARRY HINSLEY

WE GOT THE ARMY ULTRA, ENOUGH OF IT, JUST IN TIME TO ENABLE GENERAL AUCHINLECK TO KEEP ROMMEL OUT OF CAIRO.

YOU SEE EVERY TIME ROMMEL PLANNED, I’LL GET THROUGH THERE, YOU SEE

AUCHINLECK COULD GET HIS FORCES JUST IN TIME . IF IT HADN’T BEEN FOR THAT

GROUND INTELLIGENCE, PLUS THE RESOURCES THAT WE WERE DESTROYING THE

GERMANS WOULD HAVE OCCUPIED CAIRO

Montgomery used Ultra in a grand deception at El Alamein which lead Rommel to attack into a British trap

CHYRON: ANTHONY CAVE BROWN, AUTHOR “BODYGUARD OF LIES”

TC: 01:39:40;06

PART OF THE BRITISH OBJECTIVE WAS TO SUPPLY THEM WITH FALSE INFORMATION ABOUT THE NATURE OF STRATEGY, THEIR MAGIC WORD. THE MISLEADING THE MIND OF HITLER BECAME A MAJOR INDUSTRY IN BRITAIN, A VERY ELEGANT INDUSTRY TOO.

Churchill depended on Ultra. He demanded daily decodes. While beneath the pavement at Storey’s Gate, near the Secret Underground Cabinet War Rooms a new covert organization was formed.

The London controlling section was created to coordinate planning. Interception of Enigma, propagation of Ultra and deception would be integrated into one grand strategy summed up in words attributed to both Churchill and Joseph Stalin.

“in war, the truth is so precious that it must always be surrounded by a bodyguard of lies… “

ACT FIVE

1942 in North Africa the Allies battled back. But suddenly, without warning, the sea war turned against them.

HARRY HINSLEY

THE FIRST OF FEBRUARY ‘42 WE LOST THE U-BOATS.

Doenitz had introduced the four rotor naval Enigma and a new key.

HARRY HINSLEY

HE STARTS THE SECOND PHASE NOW WITH EVEN MORE U-BOATS WITH BIGGER RANGE. THE LOSSES START GOING UP TO ABSOLUTELY STUPENDOUS LEVELS, HIGHER THAN EVER BEFORE.

Bletchley named Doenitz’s new key Shark, and, as losses mounted attacked it desperately. For eight long months they failed.

Then, in September 1942 the British destroyer Bulldog found a German sub in the Mediterranean. Depth charges brought it to the surface, as the crew abandoned ship and the U-559 foundered. Three British sailors dove into the sinking sub, grabbed the codes. Only one sailor got out. Anthony Fasson and Colin Grazier went down with the boat. But the British had the keys. In November, Bletchley broke back into Enigma into Shark.

But in 1943 yet another new cipher machine appeared which encoded and transmitted simultaneously by teletype. It was much faster, and used at the highest level of Nazi command. The machine was called Geheimschreiber, secret writer. The British called the code “Fish”.

The British used their experience with Enigma, they attempted to break Fish.

CHYRON: PETER HILTON, DISTINGUISHED PROFESSOR MATHEMATICS, S.U.N.Y.

TC: -1:42:50;13

AGAIN IT WAS SERIOUS PROCEDURAL ERRORS ON THE PART OF THE GERMAN

OPERATORS INADVERTENTLY ENCIPHERING TWO MESSAGES USING THE SAME KEY.

Turing’s Bombe was electro-mechanical. To break the new codes they would have to build hundreds of Bombes. They needed something faster. They needed the speed of electrons... They needed an electronic device. To break the secret writer, the Bletchley group created the world’s first electronic computer, Colossus. It came on line just in time for D-day.

HARRY HINSLEY

WITH THAT CIPHER AVAILABLE AS WELL AS THE ENIGMA WE GRADUALLY WERE

ABLE TO BUILD UP KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE GERMAN FORCES OPPOSING THE

LANDING WE HAD THE WHOLE STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL PICTURE OF THE GERMAN

PLANS AND DISPOSITIONS FOR THROWING OFF THE INVASION.

Eisenhower embraced Ultra and made deception a key to his D-day strategy. A phantom army under

General George Patton was created to convince the Germans that the invasion would come at the Pas de

Calais.

CHYRON: DAVID KAHN, AUTHOR “BREAKING ENIGMA”

TC: 01:44:15;29

THE FACT THAT WE KNEW WHAT THE GERMANS WERE THINKING AND WHAT THEY WERE SAYING, AND HOW MANY OF THESE MESSAGES WERE BEING ACCEPTED, ENABLED US TO VERY MUCH BETTER PLAN THIS OPERATION AND CARRY OUT THE DECEPTION.

Persuaded that the Normandy landing was only a feint, Hitler held back his forces … until it was too late.

Ultra aided in the breakout at Falaise pocket in Normandy. Some Germans were suspicious…the Allies were too prepared, too intuitive, too lucky.

The Germans were reluctant to face reality. The coding officers found it difficult to admit to themselves, to their chiefs and to Der Fuehrer that everything they’d done was worthless. Instead, they believed the more obvious…that the Allies had penetrated the high command. To the Nazis humans could be weak, but their war machine was infallible.

PETER HILTON

BECAUSE OF THIS ARROGANCE, BECAUSE THEY DESPISED US SO MUCH, THEY HELD US IN SUCH CONTEMPT. THEY COULDN’T THINK THAT WE, THE UNTER MENCH, THE SUB-RACE, COULD POSSIBLY BE DECIPHERING MESSAGES ENCIPHERED BY THE UBER MENCH, THE SUPER RACE. I MEAN IT WAS JUST CONTRARY TO THEIR WHOLE PHILOSOPHY, AND THANK GOODNESS FOR THAT.

To the end of the thousand year Reich, which lasted twelve years , the Germans entrusted their most secret plans to Enigma. They never caught on...

The enigma of Enigma is why the Allies were able to break it. The machine cipher was considered unsolvable. The Germans devoted great organizational skill to safeguarding their secrets. Yet the safeguard itself and the supreme faith placed in it by its creators became one of the most powerful weapons in the Allied arsenal.

Many factors combined to break Enigma. Desperate Poles created new mathematical theories, a German turned traitor, tired soldiers gave out keys, brilliant minds came together at Bletchley Park.

But perhaps the most important element was the character of the Nazi’s themselves. The Nazi tyranny did not encourage free thought. The Allies were able to identify and to put their best minds into cryptology. In Germany, the best minds did not go into cryptology. Many of the best minds went into concentration camps.

PETER HILTON

TO GET RID OF SO MANY OF YOUR LEADING INTELLECTUALS IF YOU WANT TO CONDUCT A HIGH-TECH WAR IS ABSOLUTELY STUPID.

The Nazis stifled thought and demanded allegiance to a race of supermen, themselves. The Nazis were at war with the intellect, at war with intelligence. The best minds worked against them, the best minds broke the unbreakable Enigma, and at the very least shorten the war.

DAVID KAHN

PEOPLE SOMETIMES SAY THAT ULTRA WON THE WAR. THIS IS AN EXAGGERATION. THE WAR WAS WON BY THE MEN IN THE TRENCHES, BY THE MEN FLYING THE AIRPLANES, BY THE MEN MANNING THE SHIPS. THESE WERE THE PEOPLE WHO WON THE WAR. WHAT ULTRA DID WAS SAVE AN AWFUL LOT OF LIVES. IT DID SO BY SHORTENING THE WAR.

I.J. GOOD

IF HITLER HAD WON THE WAR HE WOULD HAVE DOMINATED THE ENTIRE EARTH. THAT WAS HIS IDEA. AND THEN HIS SYSTEM WOULD HAVE LASTED, AS HE HAD HOPED, FOR A THOUSAND YEARS. THAT’S WHAT HE WAS AFTER.

I THINK PEOPLE JUST WANT TO BE MODEST IN THEIR CLAIMS, SO THEY MAKE A CLAIM THAT IS REALLY REASONABLE, THAT IT SHORTENED THE WAR BY TWO YEARS. BUT IT MIGHT HAVE, IT MIGHT HAVE SAVED, IT MIGHT HAVE SAVED CIVILIZATION.

After the war Winston Churchill wrote a multi-volume history of the conflict. He had learned his lesson well. He never mentioned Ultra.

Marion Rejewski fled to England during the war. After the war from the Polish government he received a few minor medals. From the Allies he received no medals, no rewards.

Hans-Thilo Schmidt was betrayed by a French agent. In 1943 he died in Gestapo hands.

In 1954, after a conviction related to his homosexuality, Alan Turing committed suicide. His ideas and the ideas of the Poles and the cryptographers at Bletchley in the heat of a desperate war. From the Bomba to the Bombes to Colossus were the archetypes for arguably the most important invention of the twentieth century, the computer…